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Making a Murderer

The Use of the Polygraph Test for Brendan Dassey in Making a Murderer

Compiled by Elana Dahlager, Timothy Darby, Christina Lee, and Matt Madsen

Brendan Dassey’s polygraph interview is an easily overlooked aspect of Making a Murderer. While it played an integral role in Dassey’s confessions and his relationship with his attorney, the polygraph interview was not done ethically. This paper explores how polygraph interviews work, their admissibility in court, how it was employed in Brendan Dassey’s case, and how testing is done on children and those with low IQs.

Part I: The History of the Polygraph Test

Modern polygraph machines were developed in 1921 by John Larson, a UC Berkeley-educated PhD and police officer. Larson based his machine off of a prototype that only intermittently measured blood pressure.1 Larson, however, had his machine measure blood pressure and respiration simultaneously in an attempt to identify deception in interviews. It was assumed that any change in these readings could indicate that the subject is lying.2  Later on in the decade, a scientist named Leonarde Keeler modified the machine to include perspiration measurements as well. Keeler assumed that a person who is lying is more likely to perspire- thus a higher reading would indicate a higher likelihood of deception.3

While there have been many technological developments in polygraph machines over the last 90 years, they have always relied primarily on the same basic measurements and assumptions.4 Blood pressure, respiration, and perspiration are still monitored (albeit with more sensitive machinery). The assumption that rises in these measurements indicate potential deception remains.5

The Polygraph Machine
Today, when a subject takes a polygraph exam, he sits in a chair and has a number of sensors attached to him. These sensors measure breathing rate, pulse, blood pressure, perspiration, and sometimes arm or leg movement.6 A typical polygraph setup includes two elastic bands equipped with sensors: one wrapped around the chest and the other around the lower abdomen. These sensors monitor respiration and changes in respiration rates between questions.7 A blood pressure cuff is attached to the upper arm, monitoring blood pressure throughout the exam.8 A sensor is placed on an index or middle finger to monitor pulse.9 There may be sensors attached to the palms to measure perspiration rates.10 There are oftentimes sensors placed on the chair to measure movement, oftentimes on the seat of the chair to detect shifting.11

These sensors monitor physiological responses throughout the polygraph examination. They are displayed simultaneously in real time on a computer screen that the interviewer sees. The readings are saved in a timeline that is later examined to determine whether or not the subject was being deceptive.


Polygraph Diagram: How Polygraph Works, Central Polygraph Services, available here.

Polygraph Interviews
Polygraph tests are almost always started with a pre-test interview. The interview is meant to acquaint the subject to the machine, testing procedures, and the purpose and target questions of the test.12 Subjects should feel more at ease when the interviewer puts the target questions in context, therefore making the test more reliable.13 Additionally, an established rapport with the interviewer may make the subject more relaxed. Subjects are asked target questions during the pre-test interview and provided the opportunity to give context to their answers.

The American Polygraph Association recommends that a trial test (asking only non-target questions) should be conducted between the initial interview and the test itself.14 This allows the subject to become acquainted to testing procedures, verifying consent to the test and improving the accuracy of test results by beginning to establish baseline readings and relaxing the subject during the test itself.15

After the pre-test interview and trial test, the actual test begins. This oftentimes involves multiple series of questions, including both target questions and control questions. Target questions those that the interviewer wants to get to the bottom of. Control questions are those where both parties know the answer. For example, a control question could be “Is today Wednesday?” Both the interviewer and subject know the answer, so it is a given that the subject is being truthful. Control questions are meant to establish a baseline reading of the subject’s physiological response to a truthful answer, allowing for comparison to answers to target questions.16 The further off the target questions’ readings are from the control questions’, the higher the likelihood of deception.17

When the test involves multiple series, it allows the examiner to ask questions between the series. This question may allow the examiner to clarify test questions to the subject or probe deeper into what the subject is thinking. For example, the examiner may ask (truthfully or not), “I’m getting a big spike at one of the target questions. Do you have anything you want to tell me?” This allows the examiner to probe into the subject’s deception or self-doubt. Whether or not the subject is lying, any information provided can aid the examiner in uncovering the truth.

Once the test series are over, the examiner must evaluate the results. The physiological readings for each question, both control and target, are given numerical scores. There is an assumption that higher physiological responses (and therefore test scores) for target questions over control questions indicate deception.18 Scoring methods may vary, but overarching assumptions remain true through all legitimate polygraph examinations.19

Polygraph results are strikingly accurate in scientific testing. Aggregated test results of 24 studies indicate a .08 rate of false negative errors (i.e. people who are lying who pass the test) and .12 for false positive errors (i.e. people who are telling the truth who fail). Inconclusive results are .09 for deceptive subjects and .13 for those telling the truth.20

Of particular interest in the case of Brendan Dassey, many studies in the 1970s demonstrated that both juveniles and low-intelligence individuals may have less accurate polygraph results.21

Part II: The Law Surrounding Polygraph Tests

The Frye and Daubert Tests
Frye v. United States was the first appellate case dealing with admissibility of a sort of polygraph test, the systolic blood pressure deception test, a precursor to the modern polygraph.22  The court found the systolic blood pressure test to be inadmissible because it lacked general acceptance in a scientific field.23 This resulted in the Frye “general acceptance” test, which stated that for scientific evidence to be permissible, “the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”  The Frye test would eventually be replaced by Daubert, which stated that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test. 24  Judges are to focus on the methods and principles the expert uses to reach its conclusions, rather than looking to prevailing wisdom/general acceptance.25  When considering whether to admit polygraph evidence, in addition to the reliability of the test and evidence, “[c]ourts balance the probative value of evidence against its tendency to unduly influence the jury.”26  The current standard regarding admissibility of polygraph evidence in federal in state court is the same as the standard for admitting other scientific, technical, or specialized evidence, unless there is a specific rule on polygraph evidence.27  Most state courts use the Frye test for determining admissibility of specialized evidence, while federal courts rely on Daubert.28 

Three Approaches to the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence
There are three general approaches to the admissibility of polygraph evidence in criminal cases.29  The traditional approach is a per se ban on the use of polygraph evidence, “either as substantive evidence or as relating to the credibility of the witness.”30  A second approach gives the trial court discretion to allow the use of polygraph evidence if, among other conditions, “the parties stipulate to the evidence’s admissibility before the administration of the test.”31  A third approach permits the use of polygraph evidence on a case-by-case basis without requiring stipulation, with most jurisdictions allowing their use “only when special circumstances exist.”32 

There is a per se ban on the use of polygraph evidence in the Second33 and Fourth Circuits.34 The following states have a per se ban against the use of polygraph evidence in criminal law trial court cases: Connecticut,35 Kentucky,36 Maryland,37 Minnesota,38 Mississippi,39 Nebraska,40 Rhode Island,41 Tennessee,42 and Wisconsin.43

The standard requiring a stipulation of admissibility by parties and counsel has gained support over the years as an alternative to the traditional per se ban on polygraph evidence.44  The leading case on stipulations for the admissibility of polygraph evidence is State v. Valdez.45  In Valdez, the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed its long time ban on polygraph evidence, stating that polygraph testimony should be “admissible upon stipulation in Arizona criminal cases.”  The court then listed the four “qualifications” that must be met to introduce the polygraph evidence as follows:

  1. The prosecutor, defense counsel, and the individual defendant all sign a written stipulation which provides for the test taker’s “submission to the test and for the subsequent admission at trial of the graphs, and the examiner’s opinion thereon behalf of either the defendant or the state.”
  2. The trial judge retains discretion to refuse the admission of polygraph evidence.
  3. If the graphs and examiner's opinion are offered in evidence, the opposing party has the right to cross-examine the examiner, the administration of the test, and the reliability of the test.
  4. The trial judge “should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a defendant is charged but at most tends only to indicate whether at the time of the examination [the individual] was telling the truth. Further, the jury members should be instructed that it is for them to determine what corroborative weight and effect such testimony should be given.”46

The following states allow polygraph evidence to be admitted where the prosecutor, defense counsel, and tested individual all stipulate to allow the results to be admitted: Alabama,47 Arizona,48 Arkansas,49 California,50 Georgia,51 Indiana,52 Kansas,53 Nevada,54 Ohio,55 and Washington.56

The third alternative is more of a case-by-case option.  These courts may allow polygraph to be admitted at the judge’s discretion, after balancing certain competing interests, or only allow the admittance of polygraph evidence for a particular purpose.  The Fifth Circuit has moved from a per se ban to a set of factors a judge must evaluate.57  Admittance of polygraph evidence is strongly disfavored, but is at the trial courts discretion in the Sixth58 and Eighth Circuits.59  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits are more receptive to the admissibility of polygraph tests, stating that the admissibility is at the discretion of the district court.60  These “case-by-case” states include: Illinois,61 South Carolina,62 West Virginia,63 New York.64      

Polygraph Evidence in Wisconsin
The use and admissibility of polygraph evidence in the State of Wisconsin is currently controlled by State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 1981) and Wis. Stat. § 301.132 (2015).65  In the first Wisconsin State Supreme Court case concerning the admissibility of polygraph evidence, State v. Bohner,66 the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on Frye in making the determination that the systolic blood pressure device was still too experimental and in too early of a stage of development to admit as evidence in a jury trial.67  Ten years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its determination that polygraph evidence was inadmissible, even when both parties had stipulated (prior to the administration of the test) that the findings would be admissible.68  The Wisconsin Supreme Court continued to enforce a per se ban the use of polygraph evidence in criminal cases until 1974, when the court decided State v. Stanislawski.69

The Stanislawski court reviewed the per se ban on “the admissibility of evidence at the time of trial . . . on the question of [an individual’s] credibility.”70  The court concluded that over past forty or so years, polygraph tests had reached a high enough level of standing and scientific recognition that a per se ban on the use of polygraph evidence was no longer appropriate.71  The Stanislawski court decided to adopt the Veldez conditions, making expert opinion as to polygraph evidence admissible in Wisconsin in criminal cases if the four Veldez conditions are met.72  The same standards applied for polygraph tests taken by both the defendant and the principal witness.73

Just seven years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court would decide State v. Dean and revert back to its prior position on the admissibility of polygraph evidence, re-establishing a per se ban on the use of polygraph evidence in criminal cases.74  In eliminating the Stanislawski rule, the court acknowledged that there was a certain amount of validity and reliability to polygraph evidence and that the science behind the polygraph had progressed, but the court felt that the Stanislawski rule had not increased the reliability of polygraph evidence.75  The Wisconsin Supreme Court also rejected the possibility of allowing a case-by-case determination of admissibility.76 The court was concerned that the jury might place too much weight on polygraph testimony, and the lack of established standards for the trial court to follow in evaluating polygraph evidence “heighten[ed the court’s] concern that the burden on the trial court to assess the reliability of stipulated polygraph evidence may outweigh any probative value the evidence may have.”77  Lastly, while Dean still largely controls the legality of the use of polygraph evidence in criminal trials, there is the possibility that a narrow exception exists through Wis. Stat. § 301.132 (2015), which “specifically authoriz[es] the use of polygraph tests of convicted sex offenders by the state department of corrections.”78

Part III: How Was the Polygraph Employed in Making a Murderer?

Although the Making a Murderer documentary did not specifically feature the polygraph in its application or at trial, it is worth exploring how Brendan Dassey’s defense lawyer as well as Dassey’s investigators utilized the polygraph in Dassey’s interrogations. Indeed, the use of the polygraph test results were a critical part of Dassey’s post-conviction trial, and according to Dassey’s post-conviction attorneys these test results were a catalyst for Dassey’s incriminating confession to his mother on May 13, 2006.


Brendan Dassey: Eric Young, 'Making a Murderer,' and the Huge Problem of False Youth Confessions, Rolling Stone (Jan. 8, 2016), available here.

Events Leading Up to the Polygraph Test
Brendan Dassey’s polygraph test took place in his interview with Michael O’Kelly on April 16, 2006. The events that led up to this test are as follows: on March 1, 2006, in an informal interview with investigators for Steve Avery’s murder trial, Dassey confessed to the murder and rape of Teresa Marie Halbach.79 The next day, Dassey was arrested and charged with homicide, mutilation of a corpse, and sexual assault.80 Five days later, on March 7th, Len Kachinsky was appointed as Dassey’s Public Defender. In his early conversations with Kachinsky, Dassey asserted his innocence despite his March 1st confession and requested a polygraph test to prove his innocence.81 Kachinsky then found Michael O’Kelly, a private investigator, through Internet ads, and arranged to have O’Kelly administer the polygraph test on April 16th at the jail where Dassey was being held.

The Polygraph Test
The Making a Murder documentary never specified the details of the polygraph test, but transcripts from Dassey’s post-conviction trials have shed light on this issue. Contrary to standards of polygraph mentioned above, O’Kelly’s polygraph test for Dassey included only three sets of questions, each of which had ten questions.82 Only two out of the three sets of questions held relevant, rather than control, questions. Of the ten questions in each of the two relevant sets, only three questions were relevant questions, with the seven remaining classified as symptomatic. The relevant questions of each set are as follows:
Set 1:
           “Did you help kill Teresa Marie Halbach?”
           “Did you help kill Teresa Marie Halbach on Monday, October 31?”
           “Was the body of Teresa Marie Halbach burned in the fire by the Steve Avery house?”
Set 2:
           “Did you see Teresa Marie Halbach in the Avery house?”
           “Did you see Teresa Marie Halbach in the Avery house on Monday, October 31?”
           “Did you touch any part of the body of Teresa Marie Halbach?”83
           Finally, although O’Kelly claimed to have videotaped the entire polygraph test, he had presumably lost the files by the time of Dassey’s post-conviction proceedings in 2010.84 

The Results of the Polygraph Test
The confusion surrounding the results of the polygraph test stems from the fact that it has three contradictory interpretations. First, according to Kachinsky, the results of the polygraph test were inconclusive, and the test results were never admitted into Dassey’s trial.85 Second, in the post-conviction trial, Dassey’s attorneys sought to admit the testimony of Dr. Charles Honts, an expert witness on polygraphs, who would have testified that he had reviewed the polygraph charts prepared by Michael O’Kelly, and that “his analysis of the charts demonstrated that Brendan Dassey passed the polygraph test given to him.”86 Dr. Honts’ testimony was not admitted on the grounds of “lack of relevance.”87 Third, despite Kachinsky claiming that O’Kelly had reported inconclusive results, O’Kelly claimed that the polygraph test results indicated a 98% rate of deception.88 This final interpretation of failure was the result that Dassey received in his May 12th interview with O’Kelly, and this set the stage for three major conversations: the interrogation by O’Kelly, the interrogation by Dassey’s investigators, and Dassey’s phone call confession to his mother.89


Survey from O’Kelly Interview: Megan Willett, Wisconsin Lawyers on ‘Making a Murderer’ — ‘I Almost Got Physically Ill’ Tech Insider, (Jan. 8, 2016) available here.

The Use of the Polygraph Test
Between April 16th and May 12th, Kachinsky elevated O’Kelly’s involvement from polygrapher to investigator.90 On May 12, 2006, immediately after Judge Fox admitted Dassey’s March 1st Confession as evidence—a heavy blow to Dassey’s trial—O’Kelly met for an extended period of time with Dassey.91 During this meeting, O’Kelly laid out photographs of the crime scene and various documents, including Dassey’s polygraph test results. This was the first time that Dassey saw his test results. O’Kelly asked Dassey what he thought the 98% on his polygraph charts meant, and Dassey’s guess was that he had passed.92 O’Kelly then told Dassey that the results showed with 98% certainty that Dassey had been lying during the polygraph test. The polygrapher-turned-investigator then gave Dassey forms to fill out about his involvement in the crime.93 O’Kelly used the failure of the polygraph test over the next few hours to guide Dassey into changing his responses on the forms until Dassey had told what O’Kelly deemed to be the “truth.” In one form, Dassey was forced to check a box between the options, “I feel sorry for what I did” and “I do not feel sorry for what I did.” When Dassey wrote an initial response proclaiming his innocence, O’Kelly made him rewrite his response, including a detailed description of the events. O’Kelly then carefully instructed the teenager to draw certain pictures of the crime, including images of the rape and of the victim chained to the bed.94


Survey from O’Kelly Interview: Megan Willett, Wisconsin Lawyers on ‘Making a Murderer’ — ‘I Almost Got Physically Ill’ Tech Insider, (Jan. 8, 2016) available here.

Events Following the Polygraph Test
Using the crafted confessions from his meeting with Dassey, O’Kelly immediately reported his interrogation results to Kachinsky and scheduled an interview with Steve Avery’s investigators for Dassey the following day. Dassey’s lawyer, Kachinsky, was informed of the meeting, but chose not to be present (later earning a dismissal for this failed representation). Throughout the meeting, Dassey remained confused and unclear in his responses to questioning.95 This interview led to Brendan’s confession over the phone to his mother that evening.96 Brendan’s trial took place from April 16 – April 27, 2007, and he was found guilty of all three charges. On August 2, 2007, Dassey was sentenced to life in jail with possible parole opportunities beginning in 2048.97 In 2010, Dassey’s post-conviction lawyers fervently argued that O’Kelly had used the polygraph test results to coerce Dassey to confess in 2006.98 Judge Fox denied Dassey’s motion for a new trial, and his decision was upheld by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.99

Part IV. Polygraph Testing in Juveniles and Those with Cognitive Impairments

There are two immediate issues that spring to mind when we think of the use of polygraph testing in “Making a Murderer” with regard to Brendan Dassey: his age and his intellectual disability. These two issues are interrelated; young people and people with mental impairments have cognitive abilities that are different from neurotypical adults. 

At the time of the crime, Brendan Dassey was 16 years old. He was also, as reported in the documentary, in special education classes. His IQ has been reported to be between 69-73.100 This is a fairly significant impairment. Adults are considered eligible for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration if they have an IQ score under 60; a person with an IQ of 60-70 may be considered eligible if they have another mitigating impairment. This means that the Social Security Administration considers adults with IQs of less than 60 unable to work. 101 Brendan Dassey’s IQ is thus a significant factor in the interrogation techniques used in interviewing him, including the use of polygraph testing.

There is a paucity of studies regarding polygraph use in juveniles, and also in people with intellectual impairments. This can surely in part be attributed to the legal trends as identified earlier in this paper: polygraph tests are rarely admissible in court. However, as we saw in “Making a Murderer,” polygraph testing is used to facilitate confessions. And as we saw in the show, many people view polygraph testing as a sort of be all, end all. Brendan himself requests that a polygraph test be administered in order to prove his innocence, and his lawyer complies.

In a study published in 1983 by the Office of Technology Administration, an overview of the research seems to suggest that polygraph tests, when looking at the variable of intelligence alone, are actually more accurate when used on people of lower intelligence. This report acknowledges that there are few academic studies regarding this specific issue, and it further acknowledges that much of the work equates intelligence with education level. Further, the work seems to attribute a tendency and ability to lie with a high intelligence, which seems to be a tenuous connection.102

This paper does spend a lot of time on the importance of setting and environment in the administration of polygraph testing. It also cites studies that seem to equate the admission of “socially undesirable attitudes” with accuracy of the lie detector test. This seems like a potentially dangerous conclusion, especially when presented with juvenile offenders, like Brendan, who as we saw in the documentary and as will be seen in the presentations about false confessions, are much more prone to give answers that they think will please their examiners.103

In watching “Making a Murderer,” the coercive nature of the questioning that is used on Brendan, both by police, and ultimately by his own lawyers, is striking. In 1981, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of using polygraph testing to elicit a confession with an adult subject who was mentally impaired.

In Henry v. Dees, the facts concerned a polygraph test agreed upon by the prosecuting attorney and Mr. Henry’s defense team. Henry was a 20-year-old man who was classified by the state of Louisiana as a “marginally mental retardate [sic].” He was charged in state court with armed robbery. His defense team and the prosecutor reached an agreement that Mr. Henry would undergo a polygraph test. If he “passed” the test­−that is, if he was found to be truthful in denying his involvement in the crime−then the prosecutor would drop the charges. If he was found to be lying, the parties agreed that Mr. Henry would plead guilty. The examiner told Mr. Henry that he had failed the test outside of the presence of counsel and before the conclusion of the polygraph test. This led Mr. Henry to provide his examiner, a police sergeant, with incriminating evidence, which was then introduced at trial.104 

In this case, Mr. Henry raised two issues, both of which seem relevant to the case of Brendan Dassey. The first was the deviation from standard examination procedures used by the police sergeant administering the test to Mr. Henry. The second issue was, given Mr. Henry’s mental impairment and the utterance of incriminating statements outside of the presence of counsel, whether Mr. Henry could really waive his constitutional rights and thus agree to plead guilty.105

The District Court ultimately overturned the previous courts’ denial of a petition for relief. The opinion states, “even assuming that Henry could meaningfully grasp his constitutional rights so as to admit of a valid waiver, we are not convinced he knew or could understand the range and scope of proper polygraph examination questioning.”106 This point seems especially relevant to the case of Brendan Dassey, wherein he asked his defense attorney for a polygraph test. Despite this fact, the court in Henry seems to be implying that a polygraph test might not be a proper examination vehicle for a person with a low IQ. The Henry decision also addresses the issue of misrepresentation by examiners of test results when explaining them to the test subject. Although the examiner in the case was a police sergeant and Brendan Dassey’s examiner was an investigator hired by his defense team, the principle of the matter remains the same: misrepresentation of results by examiners can affect the overall result and lead to false and coerced confessions, which are not admissible in a court of law.

This case does not seem to set state or federal standard, however. A cursory review of legal cases concerning polygraph testing in individuals with low IQs would seem to suggest that state courts across the country agree that people with mental impairments who submit to polygraph testing and subsequently confess, absent coercive circumstances as found in Henry, (that is, deviating from standard testing procedures and questioning outside of the presence of counsel) do so voluntarily. The consensus seems to be that there is no Miranda violation inherent to the use of polygraph testing in people with low IQs.

Juvenile cases seem to tow much the same line. As those of us who took criminal procedure are surely aware, much of the case law concerning juvenile interrogation (and thus polygraph testing) has to do with definitions of custody and voluntariness. In 2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case wherein a juvenile argued that although he had consented to a polygraph test, the post-polygraph questioning was involuntary because he did not specifically consent to it. Though he was a juvenile, the Ninth Circuit did not find the need for a separate rule for juveniles that would require a warning for these post polygraph questions, and instead held that previous decisions which found that adults did not require a separate waiver for post-polygraph questioning also held for juveniles.107

There has not been much academic study of the use of polygraph testing in juveniles or people with significant mental impairments. The studies that do exist do not suggest that polygraph tests are less accurate on juveniles or those with low IQs. Rather, the issue is that these populations are more vulnerable to coercive interrogation techniques and less able to understand their constitutional rights with regard to self-incrimination, and polygraph testing may play a significant part in eliciting coerced confessions.

Brendan Dassey’s polygraph interview was clearly mishandled. It was used in a coercive manner by Dassey’s own counsel to elicit a confession. Brendan could not grasp the complexity and seriousness of a polygraph interview, as he was a minor with a low IQ. While appellate courts have done nothing to address this maladministration in Dassey’s case, it was clearly done incorrectly. It should serve as a cautionary tale for any defense counselor looking at subjecting his client to a polygraph- especially if the client may not be able to consent.

1. Exra Carlsen, Truth in the Machine, California Magazine.

2. Lie Detection: The Science and Development of the Polygraph, Illumin, (Mar. 16, 2015).

3. Id.

4. Id.

5. Id.

6. How Does a Lie Detector (Polygraph) Work?, HowStuffWorks, (Last viewed Mar. 12, 2016).

7. How Polygraph Works, Central Polygraph Services, (last viewed Mar. 12, 2016).

8. Id.

9. Id.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Raymond Nelson, Scientific Basis for Polygraph Testing, 44 Polygraph 1.

13. Id.

14. Id.

15. Id.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Supra note 6.

19. Id.

20. Id.

21. Id.

22. 1 -8 Criminal Law Advocacy § 8.05.

23. 1-8 Criminal Law Advocacy § 8.05.

24. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).

25. 1-15 Criminal Investigation Handbook P 15.03.

26. 1-15 Criminal Investigation Handbook P 15.03.

27. 1-8 Criminal Law Advocacy § 8.05.

28. 1-8 Criminal Law Advocacy § 8.05 [2].

29. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1989); 1-15 Criminal Investigation Handbook P 15.03 (2015).

30. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1533.

31. Id.

32. Id.

33. United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).

34. United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 1999).

35. State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 758-59 (Conn. 1997).

36. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 704, 709 (Ky. 1991).

37. State v. Hawkins, 604 A.2d 489, 492 (Md. 1992).

38. State v. Opsahl, 513 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Minn. 1994).

39. Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1999).

40. State v. Allen, 560 N.W.2d 829, 842 (Neb. 1997).

41. In re Odell, 672 A.2d 457, 459 (R.I. 1996).

42. State v. Campbell, 904 S.W.2d 608, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

43. State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 (Wis. 1981).

44. 1-8 Criminal Law Advocacy § 8.05.

45. Id.

46. See State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894, 900-01 (Ariz. 1962).

47. Ex parte Clements, 447 So.2d 695, 697-98 (Ala. 1984).

48. State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (Ari. 1962).

49. Wingfield v. State, 796 S.W.3d 574, 576 (Ark. 1990).

50. Cal Evid Code § 351.1(a).

51. Forehand v. State, 477 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 1996).

52. Majors v. State, 773 N.E. 2d 231, 238 (Ind. 2002).

53. State v. Lumley, 977 P.2d 914, 918 (Kan. 1999).

54. Kazalyn v. State, 825 P.2d 578, 580 (Nev. 1992).

55. State v. Hesson, 675 N.E.2d 532 (Ohio Ct. App., Washington County 1996).

56. State v. Gregory, 910 P.2d 505, 508 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).

57. United States v. Posado 57 F.3d 428, 432-35 (5th Cir. 1995).

58. United States v. Weiner, 988 F.2d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 1993).

59. United States v. Waters, 194 F.3d 926.

60. United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1999), United States v. Benavidez-Benavidez, 217 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2000).

61. People v. Fletcher, 768 N.E.2d 72, 82 (2002).

62. Bruno v. State, 556 S.E.2d 393, 395 (S.C. 2001).

63. State v. Blake, 478 S.E.2d 550, 555 (W. Va. 1996).

64. People v. Angelo, 666 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (N.Y. 1996) (applying the Frye test).

65. Armstrong v. Bertrand, 336 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2003).

66 State v. Bohner, 246 N.W. 314 (Wis. 1933).

67. See State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 633 (Wis. 1981).

68. See Le Fevre v. State 8 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Wis. 1943).

69. State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 633 (Wis. 1981).

70. State v. Stanislawski, 216 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Wis. 1974).

71. See id. at 13.

72. Id. at 14-15.

73. Id.

74. See State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 (Wis. 1981).

75. Id.

76. Id.

77. Id.

78. Armstrong v. Bertrand, 336 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2003).

79. What Happened to Brendan Dassey – After Making a Murderer Update, Gazette, Gazette Rev., Jan. 3, 2016.

80. Caitlin Gallagher, Did Brendan Dassey Kill Teresa Halbach? 'Making A Murderer' Attempts To Explain His Confusing Case, Bustle, Jan. 7, 2016.

81. Gazette, supra note 1.

82. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 19-21, Wisconsin v. Dassey, (2010) (No. 06-CF-88).

83. Id.

84. Id.

85. Gazette, supra note 1.

86. Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 231–32.

87. Id.

88. Gazette, supra note 1.

89. Id.

90. Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 4, at 25–26.

91. Gazette, supra note 1.

92. Megan Willett, Wisconsin lawyers on ‘Making a Murderer’ — ‘I almost got physically ill’, Tech Insider, Jan. 8, 2016.

93. Id.

94. Id.

95. Ryan Felton, Controversial Making a Murderer lawyer: 'I don't get Netflix at home', The Guardian, Jan. 20, 2016.

96. Tech Insider, supra note 14.

97. Gazette, supra note 1.

98. Gallagher, supra note 2.

99. Id.

100. Lampen, Claire. "The Disturbing Reason Brendan Dassey's Conviction Is Even Worse Than Steven Avery's." Mic. N.p., 04 Jan. 2016. Web. 13 Mar. 2016.

101. "12.00-Mental Disorders-Adult." Social Security Administration. N.p., n.d. Web. 13 Mar. 2016.

102. Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation. Washington, D.C.: Congress of the U.S., Office of Technology Assessment, 1983. Web.

103. Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation. Washington, D.C.: Congress of the U.S., Office of Technology Assessment, 1983. Web.

104. Henry v. Dees 658 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1981).

105. Id.

106. Id. at 406, 409.

107. United States v. Jordan P.W., 168 F. App'x 150 (9th Cir. 2006).